This volume relates the problems faced by Allies who met in strange lands without the benefit of tested and well co-ordinated policies to govern their diplomatic and military relations. The jealousies and conflicting interests of nations and of government agencies, together with the overlapping of authorities, aggravated an already complex situation. The history here presented seems to make axiomatic the necessity for a single commander in the field who has clear-cut instructions based on long-range plans that have been evolved from past experience and precedent.

Because of its valuable information and acute analysis, this book is essential reading for those faced with the responsibility of future planning in the realms of strategy and its logistical elements. Soldier, diplomat, and financier will find in the following pages a forewarning of the type of problems to be encountered whether in the field of transportation, communications, access to raw materials, the insurance of uninterrupted oil supplies, or in the unpredictable and delicate job of international relations.

Those on the ground struggled with immediate problems not always clearly seen from a distance. Anticipation, planning, and study of history may reduce, if not eliminate, such difficulties in the future.

The author, who holds a Ph.D. from Yale, spent more than two years with the U.S. Army in the Middle East during the war and served for nearly seven years as Chief of the Middle East Section, Office of the Chief of Military History. He has published books and articles in the field of literary and historical scholarship.

Washington, D. C.
15 December 1951

ORLANDO WARD
Maj. Gen., U. S. A.
Chief of Military History
framework of economic, social, and political factors, without, I hope, taking my eye from the object, which was to show how the Army got there, what it did, and what its activity meant.

I have drawn for primary sources upon official documents and upon interviews and correspondence, and for secondary sources upon narratives prepared during the war at U.S. Army headquarters, Tehran. The location of documents cited in the footnotes may in some instances be ascertained by reference to the Glossary, where designations of collections are explained. The chief of these include the files of headquarters and subheadquarters of the American commands at Tehran and Cairo; and at Washington the files of the War Department General Staff, War Plans and Operations Divisions, the Historical Records Section, Departmental Records Branch, Adjutant General's Office, the Control and International Divisions, Army Service Forces, the Military Intelligence Division, the files of the North Atlantic Division Engineer and of the New York Ordnance Department (both at New York); and at Washington again, the files of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, the Office of the Chief of Transportation, the Department of State, and the Foreign Economic Administration. Smaller selected files assembled by the historical sections at Tehran and Cairo (cited as the Persian Gulf Files and the Middle East Files respectively) have also been heavily drawn upon. I am obliged to the officials of the Historical Section, Cabinet Office, London, for their courtesy in furnishing copies of British documents not available in American files; and to the following civilian contractors who allowed access to the records of their Persian Corridor operations and, through conference and correspondence, supplied valuable information or commentary: Foley Brothers, Inc.; Spencer, White and Prentis, Inc.; the General Motors Overseas Corporation; the Douglas Aircraft Company; the J. G. White Engineering Corporation; the Bahrain Petroleum Company; and the Bechtel-McCone Company. Specific obligations in these and all other instances are cited in the footnotes.


Most useful of secondary sources were the studies prepared in the Historical Section, Office of Technical Information, Headquarters, Persian Gulf Command, by 1st Lt. Francis J. Lewis, Acting Chief of the Section, and the following noncommissioned officers: Laurence P. Corbett, Ralph W. Kerns, Victor H. Pentlarge, Jr., Ogden C. Reed, Wallace P. Rusterholtz, and George B. Zeigler. They are narratives (cited with their authors' names in the footnotes) totaling a quarter of a million words, written at the level of the operating units. The studies provided information, background, and a reservoir of incident and comment of the sort that does not reach papers produced at the highest levels. Three of these narratives, abridged by Sylvia Josif (Mrs. Harold Josif), provided the starting point for my chapters on port, railway, and trucking operations.

Of help received from members of the Office of the Chief of Military History I particularly mention the expert collaboration in statistical matters of George Powell and the skill, tact, and taste with which Miss Ruth Stout, for two years as my editorial assistant and thereafter as Associate Editor, shepherded the manuscript into print. Finally, I wish to note that this project was undertaken in 1944 by invitation of Dr. Walter L. Wright, Jr., first Chief Historian of the Army, whose interest continued after he left the Pentagon in 1946 and persisted to his untimely death at Princeton University in 1949.

Washington, D. C.
15 December 1951

T. H. VAIL MOTTER

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The Frontispiece, supplied by the Department of State, is from the White House files.

The two photos are from the U. S. Air Forces, Department of Defense.

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